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Question 
What examples are there of donor funded alliances or networks that have been successful in 
promoting regional coordination between 3 or more countries which share common issues or 
transnational challenges? 
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1. Overview 
There are a significant number of donor funded regional cooperation arrangements across a 
broad range of thematic areas. However, the level of their success varies considerably, and the 
literature search carried out for this report did not identify any unqualified successes. Areas of 
cooperation include: 
• Defence: Donor funding for regional cooperation on defence issues includes funding for 
the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin, which is currently engaged in 
fighting Boko Haram. It also includes considerable support for the African Union (AU) and 
the Regional Economic Commissions (RECs) focusing on the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA). While these cooperation initiatives have had some notable 
successes, a significant number of challenges remain. These challenges are outlined in 
Section 2 of this report. 
• Environmental issues: An example of donor funded cooperation on environmental 
issues is the Nile Basin Initiative, which aims to facilitate dialogue between member 
states and advance joint water management projects. This initiative is widely considered 
to be a success, although a rigorous evaluation of its achievements was not found during 
the course of the research conducted for this report. 
• Economic integration: Donor support for economic integration, for example through the 
European Commission and SIDA, has had some successes, however due to the lack of 
evaluations it is unclear how this success has been measured. 
There is a relatively large body of literature on regional cooperation arrangements funded by 
donors, however it focuses largely on obstacles rather than successes. The literature search 
conducted for this research identified no rigorous evaluations of the impact of donor funding on 
these arrangements and it is therefore difficult to determine the extent of their success, or the 
role that donor support has played in their achievements. The majority of the literature identified 
during the course of this research focuses on regional cooperation in Africa, with no successful 
regional cooperation efforts identified in North Africa. The literature consists of books, peer-
reviewed journal articles and policy papers and is largely ‘gender-blind’.  
2. Donor funded alliances supporting regional cooperation 
A significant number of donors are funding regional cooperation initiatives. However, their 
success has been varied. The literature search conducted for this report did not identify any 
unqualified successes when it comes to donor support for regional cooperation initiatives. 
Examples of regional cooperation efforts that have demonstrated at least some degree of 
success are discussed in Section 3. 
Some of the challenges relating to donor support for regional cooperation initiatives are outlined 
in this section. An example of these challenges is the case of the European Commission (EC), 
which allocates 59 per cent of regional aid to regional economic integration. Despite their 
substantial support for regional cooperation, this aspect of the EC’s development assistance has 
been marred by a number of shortcomings. A European Centre for Development Policy 
Management (ECDPM) policy brief identifies a number of reasons for this:  
• A lack of managerial capacity among regional organisations. 
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• Countries having overlapping memberships of regional organisations.  
• A lack of progress in implementing regional agendas at a national level, and protracted 
negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).  
• The EC’s management capacity.  
• Absence of appropriate governance structures for managing regional cooperation. 
• Limited synergies between national and regional programming. 
• Weak monitoring systems (ECDPM, 2016). 
Another ECPDM policy brief focusing on support for regional cooperation in Africa, notes that 
donor’s emphasis on supporting the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Commissions 
(RECs) is misguided. It argues that many regional organisations are experiencing both internal 
and external challenges, stating that some regional organisations in Africa ‘are clearly 
dysfunctional and demonstrate major implementation gaps’ (Söderbaum, 2016). In these cases, 
there is little evidence to suggest that donor support has resulted in positive and sustainable 
development outcomes (Söderbaum, 2016). 
In Africa, regional and continental projects and processes that have been supported through 
donor funds include the peace and security architectures of the AU and the regions; continental 
agricultural and food security programmes under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP); the mobilisation of support for Africa’s priority infrastructure 
projects through Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA); and sensitisation 
on gender equality and empowerment (Vanheukelom et al, 2016, p. 30). However, there are a 
number of issues: 
• The majority of donor finance continues to be fragmented, and is provided as project aid, 
not budget support.  
• A lot of donor funding to regional organisations remains off-budget, reducing the potential 
for regional organisations and their member states and stakeholders to know what goes 
into the budget and who is funding what. This reduces the potential of member states to 
assess to what extent the budget finances policy priorities.  
• The amounts and timing of the contributions by member states to the budgets of AU and 
RECs are not reliable.  
• Due to earmarking and project focused funding, donor preferences become more central 
to the agenda of regional organisations. In combination with donor conditionality this can 
create incentives for regional organisations to signal regional reforms, rather than to 
strengthen core functions (Vanheukelom et al, 2016, p. 30). 
3. Case studies 
This section provides a number of examples of donor funded regional cooperation initiatives. 
Those selected are generally viewed to have had some degree of success, although this is not 
supported by rigorous evaluations. 
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Defence 
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) 
Member States: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin. 
The MNJTF is mandated by the AU, but operates under the authority of the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission (LCBC). In terms of funding, the MNJTF received EUR 50 million in 2016 from the 
European Commission. This is meant to meet its logistical and material needs and to cover some 
of its human resources costs. These include land and air transport requirements; secured 
communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; equipment for the command 
headquarters and the camps in the sectors of operations, and bonuses for the troops (Assanvo 
et al, 2016, p. 9). Other donors include the UK, which has provided USD 3.5 million. Despite 
donor support, the MNJTF is still primarily funded by the participating countries. There are 
concerns that this will not be sustainable in the long run (Assanvo et al, 2016, p. 9). 
 
Figure 1: MNJTF institutional architecture (Assanvo et al, 2016, p. 5). 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) describes the MNJTF as relatively successful in combatting 
Boko Haram (ICG, 2017, p. 5). This view is supported by other authors including Tar and Sunday 
(2017, p. 9). Specific success factors include:  
• A de-escalation in fighting  
• Bombing has reduced since insurgents’ supply lines have been cut. They now lack food 
and ammunition, and their communication lines have been reduced.  
• Many of the territories controlled by the insurgents have been taken back and people are 
returning home (Tar & Sunday, 2016) 
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• In the first five months of 2016, its interventions had reportedly led to the ‘neutralisation’ 
of at least 675 presumed Boko Haram members, the arrest of 566 others and the 
dismantling of nearly 32 training camps and alleged factories for the manufacture of 
improvised explosive devices and mines (Assanvo et al, 2016, p. 9). 
• Nearly 4690 of the group’s hostages have reportedly been freed (Assanvo et al, 2016, p. 
9). 
Despite these achievements, attacks by Boko Haram continue. These take place mainly in 
northeastern Nigeria and southern Niger (Tar & Sunday, 2017, p. 9). Moreover, according to the 
ICJ, despite its relative success the actions of the MNJTF have driven thousands of men and 
women to joining Boko Haram to seek revenge or protection against the abuses they have 
suffered (ICG, 2017, p. 8). 
AU and the RECs 
Long-term donor support for capacity building in peace and security through the AU and the 
RECs is reportedly producing results. Achievements listed include the AU and the RECs’ 
involvement in the crisis in South Sudan, in combatting Boko Haram, and the AU’s peacekeeping 
interventions in Somalia (Söderbaum & Borlin, 2016, p. 64). However, the degree to which these 
interventions have been successful is not clear. 
In particular, donors have provided funding for the development of the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA). Under APSA, the RECs achievements in the field of peace and 
security include Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning 
and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), which has been deemed relatively successful. It is more 
developed compared to most other RECs and its involvement in assessing election related 
threats in Kenya in 2008 was largely considered to be a success (Lucey and Mesfin, 2016). 
CEWARN is supported by Germany, the US, the UK and Canada (Klingebiel et al, 2008, p. 30). 
Moreover, according to Kabia (2011, p. 8) the Economic Community of West African States 
ECOWAS’ peace and security mechanism now includes legally binding protocols and institutional 
frameworks to understand and address violent conflicts. Examples include the Protocol Relating 
to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, 
and the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, as well as the West African Conflict 
Early Warning and Early Response Center (Dossan, 2016, p. 31). Likewise, its early warning 
system, ECOWARN, is an important component of its conflict prevention efforts (Tejpar and Lins 
de Albuquerque, 2015). However, the extent to which donor funding has played a part in these 
achievements is unclear. 
Both IGAD and ECOWAS receive considerable donor support. Other RECs, such as the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS) receive less donor attention (Klingebiel et al, 2008, pp. 36-37) 
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Environmental challenges 
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) (est.1999) 
Member states: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, DRC and 
Eritrea (observer) 
Donors:  These include Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the World Bank. Other bilateral and 
multilateral NBI development partners include: the African Development Bank, Germany, the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the UNDP, and the United 
States. The majority of funds supporting the NBI’s projects and programmes are managed 
through the World Bank managed Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF).1 
According to GIZ, as a result of donor support, the NBI Secretariat is an effective organisation 
that is capable of delivering the services expected from a river basin organisation. Specific 
achievements of the NBI Secretariat include: 
• It is supporting the exchange of information on water resources. 
• It is able to provide hydrological and socio-economic planning scenarios. 
• It has reached an agreement with the Nile Basin riparian states on common principles 
and strategies for many of the issues relating to transboundary water management.  
• The organisation’s capabilities and skills are now being used at the regional level to 
assist in joint decision-making, and are also being applied in the member states’ own 
national planning processes.2 
The Nile Basin Initiative has also contributed to building trust, and preventing conflict among Nile 
Basin states. At sub-basin level, NBI is coordinating investments in regionally coordinated 
infrastructure and watershed management projects with total value of around USD 1.4 billion. 
This includes interconnecting regional power networks so that the benefits of hydropower 
development in one part of the basin can be shared with other Nile Basin riparian states, thus 
defusing conflicts over water allocation.3 
According to Byiers, the strength of the NBI lies in its technical abilities.4 Its Collaborative Water 
Assessment Process helps to model different scenarios of the water resource levels and impacts 
of investments.5 The article also states that sub-regional approaches and subsidiarity appear to 
allow sub-regional alignment around narrowed common interests, and thus specialisation. The 
NBI has two Subsidiary Action Programmes. The first one, organised around the Eastern Nile 
Technical Regional Office (ENTRO) for the Eastern Nile, is autonomous from the NBI Secretariat 
while the second is the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP).6  
                                                 
1 http://www.internationalwatersgovernance.com/nile-river-basin-initiative.html 
2 https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/14940.html 
3 https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/14940.html 
4 http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/nile-basin-initiative-regional-sailboat-choppy-geopolitical-waters/ 
5 http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/nile-basin-initiative-regional-sailboat-choppy-geopolitical-waters/ 
6 http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/nile-basin-initiative-regional-sailboat-choppy-geopolitical-waters/ 
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Economic integration 
Swedish funding for economic integration in Africa focuses mainly on supporting capacity 
building for increasing economic integration at the regional level. Substantial progress has 
reportedly been made in this area. Swedish assistance has reportedly resulted in the 
establishment of a certification programme for economic actors involved in import and export that 
has reduced the time and costs associated with international trade. However, due to several 
delays in the implementation of interventions in this sector anticipated results were not achieved 
within the estimated timeframe (Söderbaum & Brolin, 2016, p. 68). 
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